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aside and directed him to rework the schedule so that he could get fifteen minutes of shuteye before the afternoon intelligence briefing. Still wearing his desert BDU blouse, he stretched his angular frame across the sofa in his office and closed his eyes.
The general awoke to the sound of voices. The room was dark save for the lamp on his desk. By its white light he saw the silhouettes of two men reviewing a map that covered the desk. Observing that the general was awake, the smaller man excused himself from the convesation and approached Franks, who was now sitting on the edge of the sofa.
Wearing a high-collared tunic and broad gold epaulets, the man clicked the heels of his highly polished boots together, bowed slightly and introduced himself, "I am General Carl von Clausewitz. I am confident that you are familiar with my writings on the subject of war, but given the current circumstances I felt a personal tutorial might be helpful."
General Franks rubbed his eyes, rose to his feet, and thanked the general for his consideration on the matter. Ever gracious, Clausewitz accepted his thanks, then said, "Your time is precious, sir, so let us press this matter. If I may be so bold as to ask, where do you anticipate conducting your initial military actions?" "Afghanistan," Franks drawled.
CCA: Lyons, McDuffie, Webb 5 "I thought as much," said the Prussian theorist "and for that reason I've asked an officer with extensive experience in that theater of operations to join us." Together they walked to the desk.
As they approached the man who had remained at the desk snapped to attention. By the light he could see that the man wore the gray dress uniform of a General Officer in the Soviet Russian leaders feared; after rising to power Tarakki's supporters in the military carried out massive purges of Afghan tribesmen in an attempt to break the tribal and religious ties of the people. 5 The backlash was a burgeoning anti-Soviet sentiment among tribesmen throughout the country.
Amin, Tarakki's prime minister, recognized the Afghan president's dwindling support among his own populace and overthrew and killed him in September 1979. 6 The rise to power of Amin, a man who had come to national prominence within a pro-Soviet regime and who continued to enjoy the benefits of Russian economic aid, virtually assured the Soviet Union that it would not realize its goal -now more than a quarter of a century old -of gaining de facto control of Afghanistan through an alliance with a Soviet-friendly government. equally as important to the populace for their spiritual significance as they are as seats of commerce. 10 The mountainous terrain serves to create natural chokepoints, funneling forces through only a handful of vulnerable, winding passes. The climate is, in a word, extreme. Winters are bitter and snowy while summer is dry and suffocating throughout most of the country. 11 Inhabitants of this unforgiving land are hard and hearty. Predominantly Muslim, Afghanistan is a civilization of tribes -allegiance to one's family and tribe is paramount. Outside of city borders, piracy, thievery, and feudal infighting among rival warlords are the norm. 12 To conduct an operation under such inhospitable conditions is a daunting task," Clausewitz smiled.
General Franks grimaced, "You can say that again." Stated simply, the basic tenet of the Brezhnev Doctrine was: "[W]ith an ally state about to fall to anarchy or outright hostile forces, intervention was an essentially defensive, reactive move to forestall such a humiliating and potentiallydangerous outcome." 13 "The USSR was the natural ally of anticolonial and anti-imperialist national liberation movements, but in this case you clearly had a country that was not a formal member of the socialist camp. Nevertheless, the USSR essentially regarded Afghanistan as a member of the wider socialist family, to which the same rules could be applied." 14 "The second concept of consequence to our discussion is the rim lands strategy. In its extreme form the Brezhnev Doctrine has been described as fear of Americanism 15 ; in the same way many people consider the prime motivation behind Soviet activity and support in outlying
Middle East oil-producing nations as a policy geared toward denying the United States access to the petroleum products of those countries. 16 Russian ideologues would adopt a different stance, arguing instead that in the same way that the United States embraced its role as protector of the hemisphere through the Monroe Doctrine, the USSR was simply protecting its own sphere of influence through engagement in the rim lands. Our strategic objective in Afghanistan was to establish a friendly buffer state that we, the Soviet Union, could control."
General Franks massaged his temples as if he were trying to rid himself of a persistent headache. Clausewitz leaned close to him and said, "We still have important ground to cover. It was no accident the initial invasion resembled the successful invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Soviet military thinking at this time totally ignored the entire concept of low-intensity or unconventional warfare. Using classic Soviet doctrine and formations formulated for fighting a war in the European Theater, the initial invasion consisted of a vertical envelopment supported by ground based motorized rifle divisions to seize key airbases and airports to ensure air superiority. The Soviet Army quickly fanned out to occupy key C3I areas, fortresses commanding roads and key cities. The more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. The political object -the original motive for the war -will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standards of measurement.
The Soviet leadership's objectives for Afghanistan were as follows:
-Replace the Amin government with one more compliant with Soviet wishes -Occupy cities and C 3 nodes, roads, and air bases -Stabilize by providing a screen behind which pro-Soviet Afghan forces would reconstitute under a more popular regime and rebuild from the decimation inflicted by rebel forces to a point where they could engage and defeat the mujaheddin -Intimidate the mujaheddin and/or foreign patrons, particularly Pakistan
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Confident of the attainability of these objectives, Moscow's initial estimate of the operation's duration was just six months."
Clausewitz offered, "In contrast the objective of the mujaheddin was far less complex.
Simply put, their objective was the expulsion of foreign troops and influence. Do not be deceived by its simplicity, however; Afghans were prepared to engage in a protracted war to ac- "Unlike my Soviet counterpart, whose forces did not train for unconventional warfare, initial U.S. forces in the theater of operations will include Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines specifically trained in that discipline. They will be adept at working with an indigenous population and massing indigenous morale: soldiers who speak the language, appreciate local customs and -just as important -know how to mass the available U.S. combat power with the capabilities of the Afghani ground forces. In so doing we will ensure that Afghans do not view our operation as an invasion, but rather as support to their efforts to overthrow an oppressive regime.
Following the fall of the Taliban, it will be necessary to deploy and employ large numbers of forces in the effort to rid Afghanistan of Al Qaeda. While the conscripts of the Soviet Army were poorly trained, lacked discipline, and had low morale in the fight against fellow Muslims, conventional U.S. forces display none of these traits. Our disciplined and well-trained forces have proven they are flexible enough to conduct a wide range of missions. These include assisting local security forces, conducting local patrols, and offering humanitarian assistance to large-scale combat operations. Using the right force for the right job goes a long way toward maintaining troop morale." General Franks continued, "Morale is critical, but U.S. forces will use other methods to ensure that we enhance Mass in this effort. I intend to use precision munitions and air power in concert with ground forces to effect rapid and decisive engagements. Differing from recent operations in Kosovo, which employed predominantly air power, combined techniques will allow more timely and accurate massing of combat power. By maintaining a small footprint of U.S. ground forces allied with local militias, these forces will be able to fix on the enemy and then request precision-guided munitions on enemy locations to achieve maximum effect. The efficiency of these techniques will erode the enemy's morale and will to continue combat operations against American forces."
"Outstanding. I'm glad to see that you appreciate the depth of these principles. There is no set answer, no single action nor decision which would allow you to say that you had complied completely with a Principle of War. A wise operational artist revisits a plan constantly looking for ways to improve it." Clausewitz composed himself as Franks and Tukharinov chuckled.
"Forgive me for that unseemly outburst. The final Principle of War that I wish to discuss is Offensive or, more specifically, the use of initiative in combat to set the time, place, strength, type, and direction of attack. To elaborate further, the force that attacks has the greatest advantage of initiative. The army that takes the offensive decides what to do and the defense must conform.
Conformation is a time-consuming process. To be sure, it is more costly to take the offensive.
That cost is extracted from a force's troops while overcoming initial objectives; in addition there are costs to fighting on unknown terrain with extended communications that may grow longer.
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A sharp attack that carries the objective is better than a slow attack of attrition. It is that final fact that struck a mortal blow to Soviet operations in Afghanistan." Clausewitz let his judgment set in with Franks before he continued. "Employing a swift initial invasion, Soviet troops rapidly seized the initiative and secured their tactical and operational objectives. As the nature of the war shifted to counterinsurgency, however, Soviet leadership faltered and ultimately abandoned its offensive mindset. We have already discussed how the rapid invasion of December 1979 gave way to an occupation force that remained in garrison whenever possible. The Soviet
Army seemed loath to change doctrine or tactics even when faced with defeat on the battlefield.
In 1984 the Russians sought to regain the offensive by carrying out operations with airborne and heliborne units in place of the huge armored columns that they had favored throughout the previous five years. In April 1984 Soviet heliborne troops seized control of two-thirds of the Panshir valley. The offensive through this critical pass slowed when the Red Army was unable to destroy completely the mujaheddin forces in short order. Rather than renew the attack using the new tactics that they had so recently validated, the Soviets returned to well entrenched government bases, which had no mobility, thereby surrendering the offensive again. An offensive around the city of Herat in June 1984 fared well for the Soviet forces in terms of territory gained, but resulted in the worst year of the entire conflict in terms of Soviet casualties. Faced with growing dissension in the force, the Soviets abandoned the offensive once more. 26 As these examples demonstrate, the Soviets lost the initiative soon after the invasion due in large part to the offensive tactics they employed. Although they enjoyed moderate success once they adopted new tactics, their offensive operations ultimately failed."
General Franks didn't wait to be asked: "Offensive is a critical component of any U.S. operation and so it will be in Afghanistan. U.S. forces will seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by employing superior ISR capabilities, precision munitions, and local militias well-versed in the tactics and terrain of Afghanistan. U.S. forces will attack at the time and place of their choosing and once they have achieved initial success they will maintain a rapid pace of operations throughout the theater. On the run with no time to regroup and consolidate combat power to mount a formidable defense, Taliban forces will virtually disintegrate beneath the force of the U.S. offensive."
Clausewitz and Tukharinov rose from their seats. "I'm afraid that we must leave, but I'm interested in what impressions you will take away from this discussion," said the Prussian as he fastened the buttons of his tunic.
General Franks replied, "The Soviets entered a conflict in 1979 with a preponderance of troops and resources. Given solely that fact, an individual might logically deduce that the Soviets should have won the war. But they were not victorious because they were lacking in something far more crucial on the battlefield. The Soviets failed to adapt meaningful concepts of Objective, Mass and Offensive to their campaign in Afghanistan.
"Although the USSR had developed relations with the Afghans over a span of a quarter of a century, it was unable to develop realistic, attainable objectives to pursue in a conflict. Pursuing a flawed objective is as hazardous to a force as entering combat with no objective at all."
"Secondly, the Soviets interpreted Mass from the purist viewpoint that a large force will tip the scale of conflict. Especially in the context of the asymmetric, unconventional war that they prosecuted, there are far more subtle ways to employ mass. The Soviets failed to recognize that using disgruntled conscripts to fight against a populace with whom the conscripts had more in common than they did with their fellow Red Army soldiers could have serious consequences."
"Lastly, offensive is crucial to control of the battlefield. It may be gained through a variety of methods, but a force that defaults to a defensive posture will never gain it. An aggressive offensive would not have overcome the absence of a true objective for the Soviets, but relinquishing the initiative ensured that they would not win the war." the lens of history it is easy to discern the errors of the Soviet military. But I recall that while the conflict in Afghanistan was ongoing, the U.S. forces that I led during the time trained primarily to defeat the Soviets in combat because they were our most credible threat. Any force is susceptible to failure if it abandons the Principles of War."
And after that statement, General Carl von Clausewitz and Colonel General Tukharinov departed out the side door.
"General, sorry to interrupt but the J-2 is standing by to give the afternoon Intel Brief."
It was the voice of his aide. General Franks opened his eyes; he was lying on the sofa in his office.
"I hated to wake you, but the brief is ready. You sure looked peaceful lying there with that book on your chest."
Franks sat up, ready for another meeting and looked at the book he now held in his hand,
On War by Carl von Clausewitz. He smiled for a moment as he examined the volume then set it on the table by the sofa. He rose and smoothed the wrinkles from his uniform. Staffers were waiting he thought, better get moving; but just before he left the general nodded in the direction of the table and told his aide, "Bring that book along. We are going to need it."
